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The experience of trade liberalization in the period since World War II has presented
economists with two puzzles. First, even in developed countries, free trade has remained
stubbornly elusive, with average trade-weighted tariﬀs remaining at low but still positive
levels.3 Second, tariﬀs have been cut only gradually under the General Agreement of
Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT). Since the GATT was drawn up after the war, tariﬀsh a v e
fallen from a trade weighted average of 50 percent to around 5 percent today. Neither of
these two facts sits well with the textbook view that sees a trade agreement as a simple
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: that is, as a situation where it is individually rational for
c o u n t r i e st oi m p o s et a r i ﬀs, but collectively rational to abolish them.
The purpose of this present paper is to propose an explanation for these two puzzles
by focusing on two particular aspects of the rules imposed on trade liberalization by the
GATT. We examine the implications for the trade liberalization process of the dispute
settlement system under the GATT, particularly a withdrawal of equivalent concessions
(WEC). In doing so, we show that the incentives created by these rules were suﬃcient to
motivate the outcomes of failure to reach free trade and gradual liberalization actually
observed.
Our work responds to concerns raised by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) about the ef-
fectiveness of the two ‘GATT pillars,’ reciprocity and nondiscrimination, to guide gov-
ernments from ineﬃcient unilateral outcomes to the eﬃciency frontier. Indeed, the basic
approach that we take to modelling these issues was established by Bagwell and Staiger,
who were the ﬁrst to characterize and analyze the fundamental features of the GATT in
a game theoretic, general equilibrium framework.4 Bagwell and Staiger’s (1999) central
point builds on the observation that the main economic purpose of a trade agreement
3It could be argued that there is no puzzle in the failure to reach free trade. In a world where trade
carries externalities, current positive tariﬀ levels could be eﬃcient. However, in practice there appears to
be a consensus that eﬃciency has not been reached; that mutual gains from trade are still available from
further multilateral trade liberalization. To keep things simple, free trade will be used as a metaphor for
this ‘yet to be obtained’ eﬃcient level of international trade.
4Elements of the analytical framework for analysis of the GATT that Bagwell and Staiger (1999)
construct can be traced to their earlier papers published in 1990, 1996 and 1997. For a synthesis, which
introduces, develops and extends their approach to a comprehensive treatment of the GATT/WTO as
an economic institution, see Bagwell and Staiger (2002).
1is to overcome the terms of trade externality that occurs when countries can inﬂuence
the world price through policy interventions. They argue that the two GATT pillars
of reciprocity and nondiscrimination provide a mechanism by which the terms of trade
externality can be overcome. But Bagwell and Staiger also point out that in practice
enforcement diﬃculties at the international level may preclude governments from fully
eliminating the terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade volumes and arriving at the
frontier. Our two main results, that free trade cannot be reached, and that the level of
openness that is possible can be approached only gradually, provide substantive analytical
support for Bagwell and Staiger’s concerns.5
The focus of this paper is on the broad sweep of trade liberalization under the GATT
in the post war period, up to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994. The idea is
to assume that two countries have signed the GATT, and then analyze the dynamic equi-
librium (liberalization) path that results when a tariﬀ reduction game is played according
to GATT rules. We undertake a formal representation of the GATT Articles in question,
setting them out in a fully speciﬁed (game theoretic, general equilibrium) framework. This
includes a formal statement of the GATT rules that govern deviation from an agreement
and the degree of retaliation allowed. We also formalize the GATT’s stipulations as to the
treatment of countries that break the GATT rules themselves. Thus, not only are we able
to characterize the liberalization process when liberalization takes place according to the
Articles. We are also able to show that, having signed up to the GATT, countries could
do no better than liberalize according to the Articles.6 This property of the theoretical
framework accords well with the historical period from the GATT’s inception in 1947 to
5Developing their earlier (1999) discussion, Bagwell and Staiger (2002 Chapter 6) take up the issue of
enforcement diﬃculties. Their general discussion is wide ranging and comprehensive, touching on some
of the issues that we consider here. But formally they consider a diﬀerent set of issues. They look at a
situation where eﬃciency cannot be enforced because governments are not suﬃciently patient, and then
show how ‘escape clauses’ under Article XIX of the GATT can rebalance an agreement, relaxing the
incentive to deviate. This they class as ‘on-equilibrium-path’ retaliation.
By contrast, we study ‘oﬀ-equilibrium-path’ retaliation, where Articles XIX and XXIII sanction varying
severities of retaliation, depending on the degree of deviation from the equilibrium path. Bagwell and
Staiger point out that aspects of Articles XIX and XXIII sanction both on-equilibrium-path and oﬀ-
equilibrium-path retaliation, depending on the circumstance. Thus the discussion we undertake in the
present paper and that of Bagwell and Staiger (2002 Chapter 6) are complementary in that they consider
diﬀerent ways in which Articles XIX and XXIII can make a trade agreement self-enforcing. See Section
4 for further details and discussion.
6In formal terms, we show in all cases that the eﬃcient equilibrium path is subgame perfect, and that
given a deviation the punishment path is also subgame perfect.
2the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Over that time, the GATT Articles were adhered
to quite closely. For example, violations of tariﬀ bindings were not often observed; see
Chapter 2 of Whalley and Hamilton (1996) for further details.7
The characterization of WEC is as follows. Suppose that a deviant country fails to
implement some agreed market access measure. Under GATT rules, contracting parties
to the agreement are allowed to do no more than to withdraw market access concessions
e q u i v a l e n tt ot h o s et h a tt h ed e v i a n tf a i l e dt oi m p l e m e n t .W em o d e le x a c t l yt h i sp e n a l t y
structure in the context of a dynamic game and examine its implications for trade liber-
alization under the GATT.
Our ﬁrst main result is that the WEC rule does facilitate trade liberalization but,
when retaliation is limited by the WEC rule, free trade certainly cannot be reached no
matter how little countries discount the future. This result contrasts markedly with con-
ventional insights from the theory of repeated games, which indicate that free trade can
be achieved, given suﬃciently little discounting. The intuition behind this ﬁrst main re-
sult is simple. A standard repeated game allows trade partners to implement the worst
(credible) punishment against a deviant. In general, the WEC rule makes such severe
punishments illegal. By outlawing a class of severe punishments, the WEC rule compro-
mises eﬃciency. But there is an additional subtlety to the result that is worth noting.
The generality of the result follows from the fact that under WEC, countries choose the
severity of their own punishment by the extent of their initial deviation. Therefore, for
any discount rate there always exists a worthwhile deviation from free trade, which is
smaller for lower discount rates, given that future punishments will be no worse than the
initial deviation. Note that for this ﬁrst result, partial irreversibility is imposed only on
one side of the agreement. That is to say, WEC limits only the actions of punishers and
not deviators from an agreement.
When only the actions of a punisher are restricted we ﬁnd that gradualism does not
arise; only when the actions of an initial deviant are restricted as well does gradualism
7In 1994, as part of the conclusion to the Uruguay Round, signatories to the GATT formed the World
Trade Organization (WTO). To some extent the analysis of the present chapter is relevant for the period
since 1994 too, because the GATT Articles were adopted in the Charter of the WTO (GATT 1994). But
since the WTO’s inception, we appear to be observing a change in the operation of the regime, with a
number of instances where rules have been broken. The reasons for this change present an important
agenda for future research, but will not be taken up here in this present paper.
3occur. We argue that a restriction on initial deviations arises from the variation in pos-
sible punishment that results. Following Bagwell and Staiger (1990, 2002 Chapter 6), in
response to a relatively small deviation WEC is allowed. However, under Article XXIII
contracting parties may also authorize, in ‘appropriately serious cases,’8 a ‘suspension of
GATT obligations.’ This, Bagwell and Staiger argue, may be associated with a standard
trigger-strategy punishment by reversion to myopic best response tariﬀs.
Our second main result incorporates these restrictions on deviants and, in so doing,
characterizes gradualism. We show that if punishments are constrained by the WEC rule
and the initial deviation by any country is also constrained, then the most eﬃcient self
enforcing path of trade liberalization is gradual. Because punishment is limited, current
tariﬀ cuts can only be made self-enforcing by the promise of future tariﬀ reductions. But
if initial deviation is suﬃciently limited as well, then it is always possible to promise
liberalization over a number of future periods that would more than compensate. So on
the equilibrium path, trade liberalization must take place over a number of periods.
We have already mentioned that Bagwell and Staiger’s work has established the gen-
eral framework in which we operate. Setting this framework in a wider context, the
paper builds on a substantial literature going back to Johnson (1953-54).9 Early contri-
butions explain trade liberalization in a standard repeated game framework, where tariﬀ
cuts from their one-shot Nash equilibrium values are explained as the outcome of self-
enforcing trigger strategies (Dixit 1987).10 As remarked above, using a trigger strategy
has two limitations. It cannot explain gradualism and moreover, free trade is always a
self-enforcing outcome with suﬃciently little discounting.
More recent literature has oﬀered several explanations as to why self-enforcing tariﬀ
8There is no formula for the determination of ‘appropriately serious cases.’ However, for the purposes
of formalization we make precise the circumstances in which a suspension of GATT obligations occurs in
the model. Details and discussion are provided in the text, especially in Section 4.
9Horwell (1966), and more recently Lockwood and Wong (2000) compare trade wars with speciﬁca n d
ad valorem tariﬀs, showing the outcomes to be diﬀerent under the respective instruments. Hamilton and
Whalley (1983) broaden considerably the basis on which tariﬀ wars can be examined by showing how
they can be studied using numerical simulations.
10Among many others, some contributions to the literature on trade agreements that use the threat of
retaliation as threat points in cooperative or non-cooperative models include Mayer (1981), Bagwell and
Staiger (1990), Bond and Syropoulos (1996) and McLaren (1997). Syropoulos (2002) examines the eﬀect
of country size, showing that if one trade partner is larger than another by a signiﬁcantly large ratio,
then it will prefer a trade war to a free trade agreement.
4agreements are gradual. The general idea is that, initially, full liberalization cannot
be self-enforcing, because the beneﬁts of deviating from free trade are too great to be
dominated by any credible punishment. But if there is partial liberalization, structural
economic change within the domestic economy reduces the beneﬁts of deviation from
further trade liberalization (and/or raises the costs of punishment to the deviator). The
individual papers diﬀer in their description of the structural change induced by partial
liberalization. Staiger (1995) endows workers in the import competing sector with speciﬁc
skills, making them more productive there than elsewhere in the economy. When they
move out of this sector they lose their skills with some probability, relaxing the constraint
on further trade liberalization. In Devereux (1997), there is dynamic learning-by-doing
in the export sector. In Furusawa and Lai (1999), there are linear11 adjustment costs
incurred when labor moves between sectors. Bond and Park (2002) show that gradualism
arises as a result of asymmetry in country size. In Chisik (2003), increasing sunk costs
of investment in the expanding export sector raise the costs of deviation, and increased
specialization gradually lowers the lowest obtainable self-enforcing tariﬀ. All of these
papers focus on elements of the domestic economy to motivate gradualism, as opposed to
elements of the international trading system that we study here.
This present paper also makes a wider contribution to the applied game theory lit-
erature on gradualism. In particular, Lockwood and Thomas (2002) study the eﬀect of
complete irreversibility of strategic actions in an abstract game, showing that irreversibil-
ity on the side both of the initial deviator and the punisher are suﬃcient for gradualism.
In this present paper we extend the framework of Lockwood and Thomas from an ab-
stract game to a tariﬀ game. Having obtained new results in the tariﬀ game framework,
we can extend the insights of the present paper to the wider ﬁe l do fa p p l i e dg a m et h e o r y
by thinking of tariﬀsi nat a r i ﬀ game as an example of strategic actions in an abstract
game. Then in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h i sp r e s e n tp a p e rw ew o u l ds a yt h a tpartial irreversibility
of the strategic action (the tariﬀ) is assumed on the side of the punisher, but the initial
deviation is unrestricted. We then see explicitly that gradualism cannot result. Only
when there is a degree of irreversibility on both sides does gradualism arise. In this sense,
11Furusawa and Lai have an Appendix where they show that with strictly convex adjustment costs, a
social planner would choose gradual tariﬀ reduction.
5the present paper extends Lockwood and Thomas (2002).12
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets up the basic analytical frame-
work, deﬁning formally the tariﬀ reduction game and the punishments for deviation al-
lowed under the GATT, focusing primarily on WEC. Section 3 then studies trade agree-
m e n t su n d e rW E C .I ti sh e r et h a tw ew i l ls e eh o wt r a d el i b e r a l i z a t i o ni sa c h i e v e di nt h i s
framework but that free trade cannot be reached. Section 4 then examines trade agree-
ments when both the extent of initial deviations and punishments is limited. It is under
these circumstances that gradual trade liberalization takes place. Section 5 concludes.
2. Optimal Tariﬀs, Trade Agreements and Punishments under
GATT
2.1. Tariﬀsa n dW e l f a r e
We work with a standard model of international trade in which two countries produce
and consume two ﬁnal goods.13 Country i is assumed to have a comparative advantage
in the production of commodity i. Countries are symmetrical in all other respects. In
particular, preferences and technologies are identical subject to a re-ordering of the goods.
Both countries are large enough to aﬀect the terms of trade. Import tariﬀsa r et h eo n l y
form of trade restriction allowed; τi
t represents the tariﬀ set by i on imports from j in
period t. Preferences of the representative consumer in each country over both goods are
given by a strictly quasiconcave utility function. The two countries’ production possibility
loci are strictly concave to the origin over the two goods.14 Without loss of generality, a
12In a two player prisoners’ dilemma with continuous actions, under complete irreversibility once players
have achieved a given level of cooperation neither can reverse their action in order to punish the other.
Under partial irreversibility, some reversal of actions is possible. Lockwood and Thomas study only
complete irreversibility on the side of both deviator and punisher while we study partial irreversibility
on the side of just the punisher as well as on the side of both deviator and punisher.
13As Bagwell and Staiger (1999) point out, a two country model is suﬃcient to carry out an examination
of the limits to reciprocal trade liberalization which is the subject here. A model incorporating more
countries is only required when issues of non-discrimination against third parties are under discussion.
We do analyze an n country model in Lockwood and Zissimos (2001), and show that the main results
hold, but we do not establish subgame perfection of punishments under GATT with respect to trigger
strategies in that earlier paper. Establishing subgame perfection for the case of n countries would be
diﬃcult and it is not clear that insight would be added.
14This general speciﬁcation also encompasses ‘endowment models of international trade.’ All the general
analysis of the paper is worked out for an endowment model example in the appendix.
6country does not set tariﬀs on its own goods. Also note that −1 < τi
t < ∞.
Within a period, t =1 ,2,...,the order of events is as follows. First, each country i,
observing the tariﬀs set by the other country (and their own) up to the previous period,
simultaneously chooses an import tariﬀ. Then, given world prices of the two goods and
tariﬀs, perfect competition in production takes place. Next, the representative consumer
in each country chooses consumption to maximize utility subject to budget constraints.
This yields the usual indirect utility function and excess demands. Then, conditional on
tariﬀs, markets clear and world prices for the goods are determined.15 This world price
will of course depend on tariﬀs, as will tariﬀ revenues. We assume that equilibrium prices
are unique.
So, we can write equilibrium welfare of any country i as a function of tariﬀso n l y .L e t
τ be the tariﬀ that a country levies on its imports, and let τ0 be the tariﬀ that its exports
face upon entry to the foreign market. In equilibrium, the indirect utility function can
be written w(τ,τ0).N o ww ec a nd e ﬁne a Nash equilibrium in tariﬀs in the usual way as
a ˆ τ such that w(ˆ τ,ˆ τ) ≥ w(τ,ˆ τ) all τ ∈ (−1,∞), i ∈ {1,2}. We will focus on symmetric
Nash equilibria. Such equilibria exist and are unique for the special cases that we consider
below, due to the symmetry of the model.
As we are focussing on tariﬀ reductions, we will assume throughout that (τ,τ0) ∈
[0,b τ]2 = F2. We assume three properties of w:
A1. w1(τ,τ0) ≥ 0,w 2(τ,τ0) ≤ 0, for all (τ,τ0) ∈ F2, and w1(τ,τ0) > 0 if τ < ˆ τ,w 2(τ,τ0) <
0 if 0 < τ0.
A1 asserts that whenever the other country’s tariﬀ is below Nash equilibrium, a country
likes an increase in its own tariﬀ, and a reduction in the tariﬀ of the other country. In other
words, the static tariﬀ game has a Prisoner’s Dilemma structure. Our second assumption
is very weak:
A2. w1(τ,τ)+w2(τ,τ) < 0 for all (τ,τ) ∈ F 2 with τ > 0.
This says that any equal reduction in all tariﬀs, starting from a situation of equal tariﬀs
15As this is a general equilibrium model, prices are determined only up to a scalar, and so some
normalization (e.g. choice of numeraire) must be made.
7at or below the Nash level, makes any country better oﬀ. Moreover, note that from the
optimality of free trade, w1(0,0)+w2(0,0) = 0. Our third assumption is:
A3. w12(τ,τ0) < 0, all (τ,τ0) ∈ F2.
That is, tariﬀs are strategic substitutes; the closer the other country’s tariﬀ is to the Nash
equilibrium tariﬀ, the smaller the gain a country makes from increasing its own tariﬀ.
2.2. Trade Agreements
We are interested in how fast countries can reduce tariﬀsf r o mt h i sn o n - c o o p e r a t i v eN a s h
equilibrium, and also whether they can ever reach free trade i.e. τ1
t = τ2
t =0 , if the tariﬀ
reduction plan must be self-enforcing i.e. the outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium.











A tariﬀ history at time t is deﬁned as a complete description of all past tariﬀsi nb o t h




t−1)}. Both countries can observe tariﬀ histories.
A tariﬀ strategy for country i =1 ,2 is deﬁned as a choice of tariﬀs τi
t in periods t =




t=1 that is generated by the tariﬀ strategies of both countries.
Given the symmetry of the model, we restrict our attention to symmetric equilib-
rium16 tariﬀ paths where τi
t = τt, t =1 ,2,...,i.e. where both countries choose the same
tariﬀ in every time period, and we denote such paths by the sequence {τt}∞
t=1.
2.3. Punishments under the GATT
Suppose that {e τt}∞
t=1 is a candidate for an equilibrium tariﬀ sequence, where e τt is the
tariﬀ “agreed” for period t. In a standard repeated tariﬀ game, the punishment that i
levies on j for deviating from {e τt}∞
t=1 is to raise its tariﬀ to the Nash level ˆ τ and maintain
it there, the most severe credible punishment (which we call a trigger strategy).
16In the sequel, it is understood that “equilibrium” refers to subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
8In practice, GATT signatories were bound by Article XVIII to adopt a withdrawal of
equivalent concessions (WEC). Under the WEC rule country i, upon observing that j has
deviated at time t−1, withdraws precisely the equivalent concessions to market access at
time t.T h a ti s ,i ft h ed e v i a n tj has set τ
j
t−1 = τ0 > e τt−1,w h e r eτ0 < ˆ τ,t h e ni nt h en e x t
period instead of retaliating by setting ˆ τ the other party withdraws the concessions made,
implementing τi
t = τ0 = τ
j
t−1 as well. We wish to analyze equilibrium paths that result
when countries are bound by the WEC rule as opposed to standard trigger strategies.
We will show that once a country has deviated by setting τ0 > e τt−1, and the other
country has invoked punishment τ0 under the WEC rule, then maintaining tariﬀsa t
τ0 thereafter is a subgame perfect equilibrium. In principle, one country could deviate
subsequently by setting τ00 > τ0, in which case the other country will again punish by
WEC in the period after deviation by setting τ00. But we show that under the present
assumptions no country has an incentive to act in this way (Proposition 1).
In addition, we must specify what would happen if a country did not adhere to
WEC when it punished another country for deviation. Under Article XXIII contracting
parties are given the power, ‘in appropriately serious cases, to authorize a contracting
party or parties to suspend GATT obligations to other contracting parties’ (Jackson
1989, page 94). In the present stylized framework, we say that to break WEC, by setting
τi
t > τ0 = τ
j
t−1 > e τt−1, results in an indeﬁnite suspension of GATT obligations among
both parties; there is an indeﬁnite return to trigger strategies ˆ τ.17 We show that WEC
is a subgame perfect punishment strategy given the alternative of breaking WEC and
provoking an indeﬁnite suspension of GATT obligations (Proposition 2).18
17By breaking WEC, Bagwell and Staiger (2002 Chapter 6) argue that a government ‘ploughs over the
ﬁnal backstop of a GATT ruling’ which will lead to a break-down of cooperation, formally equated to
trigger strategies.
18In the paper we follow the relatively simplistic approach of assuming that punishments are imposed
symmetrically. This assumption has been criticized because all parties have an incentive to ‘renegoti-
ate away from’ these punishments during the punishment phase. Farrell and Maskin (1989) and van
Damme (1989) show that punishments must be asymmetric in order for the punisher to do better under
punishment than any feasible alternative. However, following Blume (1994) and McCutcheon (1997) we
argue that symmetric punishments can be used to enforce a trade agreement if renegotiation away from
punishments sanctioned by the GATT is suﬃciently costly. Such renegotiation of the rules is outside the
authority of trade negotiators and is more costly than negotiation ‘within the rules,’ requiring ratiﬁcation
in national legislatures rather than routine rubber stamping by trade negotiators. McCutcheon shows
that when renegotiation is more costly than the stipulated trigger strategies then trigger strategies may
be used to sustain an agreement. Renegotiation proofness requires ﬁnite punishments. Our use of inﬁnite
punishments is a simplifying but inessential short-cut.
93. Failure to Reach Free Trade
In this section we analyze the trade agreement that is feasible when only the actions
of punishers are restricted by WEC. The actions of initial deviants are completely unre-
stricted, as in a standard repeated tariﬀ game. We will see that on the eﬃcient equilibrium
path some liberalization is possible but that free trade cannot result. This result is shown
to hold in general for all discount rates. However, the eﬃcient liberalization path does
not exhibit gradualism. For that, the actions of initial deviants must be restricted as well
(as in Section 4).
3.1. Optimal Deviations
We begin by characterizing the optimal deviation from a symmetric equilibrium path
{e τt}∞
t=1 for any country i, given that it rationally anticipates that it will be punished by
the WEC rule. Let i’s optimal deviation at t from the reference path {e τt}∞
t=1 be denoted
zt. Note that the withdrawal of equivalent concessions applies only to deviation by setting
at a r i ﬀ above the agreed rate e τt. Under WEC, no punishment is imposed if a country
deviates by cutting tariﬀs below the agreed level e τt. Thus there is an asymmetry in the





(1 − δ)w(zt,˜ τt)+δw(zt,z t) if zt > e τt
(1 − δ)w(zt,˜ τt)+( 1− δ)
P∞
s=t+1 δ
s−tw(˜ τt,˜ τt) if zt < e τt
(3.1)
We are interested in the optimal deviation zt i.e. the choice of zt that maximizes ∆(zt,{e τt}∞
t=1)
given the reference path. The largest possible gain from deviation is the supremum of
∆(zt,{e τt}∞
t=1) across all values of zt 6= e τt, w h i c hw ed e n o t eb y∆({e τt}∞
t=1).










This result says that the best that a country can do is either to replicate the payoﬀ on
the equilibrium path - the second term in curly brackets - or to deviate by setting tariﬀs
19We show in Proposition 1 below that (3.1) generates a punishment path that is subgame perfect.
10above the agreed level; zt ≥ ˜ τt.I tc a nn e v e rb e n e ﬁt by a unilateral deviation zt < ˜ τt.20
Now, from the ﬁrst term in curly brackets which gives the gains to deviation, deﬁne
z (τt)=a r gm a x
zt≥˜ τt
{(1 − δ)w(zt,˜ τt)+δw(zt,z t)}. (3.2)
z (.) can be thought of as a kind of “reaction function” indicating how the optimal devi-
ation varies with the agreed tariﬀ ˜ τt. We can now obtain a characterization of z(.) that
is very useful. Deﬁne
ζ (τ)=a r gm a x
z {(1 − δ)w(z,τ)+δw(z,z)} (3.3)






where D>0 from the second-order condition for the choice of z in (3.3). So if A3 holds
then ζ
0 (τ) < 0. Also, deﬁne τ to satisfy:
τ = ζ (τ) (3.4)
This is a self-enforcing tariﬀ level: i.e. at τ the optimal deviation is in fact not to deviate
at all.
We now have the following characterization of z(.):
Lemma 2. Assume A1-A3. There is a unique solution to (3.4), for which τ < b τ. The
solution to (3.2) satisﬁes: (i) for all τ < τ,z (τ)=ζ (τ) ≥ τ > τ; (ii) for all τ ≥ τ,
z(τ)=τ; (iii) z (0) > 0.
Lemma 2 shows that for all tariﬀs τ less than τ the optimal deviation is to set a
tariﬀ above τ; z(τ)=ζ (τ) ≥ τ > τ.F o rt a r i ﬀs τ greater than or equal to τ the optimal
deviation is just τ itself; z(τ)=τ.R e c a l lt h a tζ (τ) is downward sloping and goes through
the point τ. Therefore, ζ (τ) < τ for all τ > τ. But then the constraint zt ≥ τt in (3.2) is
binding.
20To see why, recall that a withdrawal of equivalent concessions applies only to upward deviations. If
a country were to deviate by setting a tariﬀ that were lower than agreed - zt < τt - the WEC rule would
not require all other countries to follow the deviant downwards. We can therefore ignore the possibility
that zt < τt because, by A1, a country would make itself worse oﬀ by deviating in this way.
11We now have a complete characterization of the optimal deviation zt,g i v e na n y
tariﬀ τt. So for any e τt in a candidate equilibrium sequence {e τt}
∞
t=1 we know the optimal
deviation for that period under WEC. This will be used to characterize uniquely the
eﬃcient equilibrium path.
Before moving on to look at equilibrium paths, it remains to conﬁrm that (3.1)
generates a punishment path that is subgame perfect, and that a withdrawal of equivalent
concessions is itself a subgame perfect punishment strategy. These two desired properties
are established in the following two results.
Proposition 1. Assume A1-A3. The payoﬀ to deviation given by (3.1) generates a
punishment path that is subgame perfect.
Proposition 1 conﬁr m st h a to n c eac o u n t r yh a sd e v i a t e dt oz(τ) and the other country
has retaliated by also adopting z(τ), neither country has an incentive to deviate again
under WEC. To see why Proposition 1 holds, remember that WEC does not require
d o w n w a r d sd e v i a t i o n st ob em a t c h e d . 21 This feature of the rule is captured formally by the
constraint zt ≥ τt in (3.2). At ﬁrst sight it might appear that an initial deviation to z(τt)
could create the incentive for a further deviation to z(z(τt)) >z (τt), once the punisher
had also adopted z(τt). In fact, under our assumptions about the model’s structure, this
would never happen, and there is no incentive to deviate subsequently from z(τt).T os e e
why, ﬁrst note that in general an initial deviation may occur at z (τt) > τ,o rz (τt)=τ.
(Lemma 2 rules out the possibility that z (τt) < τ.) If z (τt) > τ t h e n ,f r o m( 3 . 3 ) ,w e
have that ζ (τt) < τ; without the constraint zt ≥ τt the best response would be to lower
and not to raise tariﬀs. But the constraint zt ≥ τt does bind in (3.2), and so the best
response to z (τt) is itself. And if z (τt)=τ then the best response once again is z (τt)
because τ is self-enforcing. Once a country has deviated to z(τ),w em u s tc o n ﬁrm that
the other country actually has an incentive to adopt a punishment consistent with WEC,
and that after that neither country has a further incentive to deviate. Conﬁrmation is
obtained in the next result.
Proposition 2. Assume A1, A2. Then WEC is a subgame perfect punishment strategy.
21Recall that the rule applies only to a withdrawal and not an extension of equivalent concessions.
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a suspension of GATT obligations under Article XXIII. In the light of Proposition 1, the
result of Proposition 2 is not surprising. First note that whether WEC is adhered to or
broken, z(τt) is the initial deviation in both cases. But the optimal deviation z(τt) is
chosen to maximize the present discounted payoﬀ, rationally anticipating that z(τt) will
also be the subsequent punishment. Under a suspension of GATT obligations, while the
initial deviation is also z(τt), the subsequent punishment is ﬁxed (at ˆ τ). So a deviation
that breaks WEC, τ0, does not take future retaliation into account.22 Therefore τ0 must
be suboptimal relative to z(τt), given that calculation of z(τt) does take into account the
subsequent continuation payoﬀs.
Given conventional repeated game logic, this result might at ﬁrst appear surprising.
W ea r eu s e dt ot h ei d e at h a ti fac o u n t r yi sv e r yi m p a t i e n t ,a tt h el i m i tδ =0 ,t h e ni t
will always gain by reneging on an agreement, triggering ˆ τ. But under WEC a country’s
impatience is reﬂe c t e di ni t sc h o i c eo fz(τt); to pick the severest case, if δ =0it is easy
to see that z(τt)=ˆ τ because the problem collapses to a stage game. So there is nothing
to gain under deviation from WEC (because under deviation the payoﬀ would also be
determined by ˆ τ), even under extreme impatience. It is then not surprising that the
result holds for all δ ∈ (0,1).
3.2. Eﬃcient Equilibrium Paths and Failure to Reach Free Trade
We can now formally deﬁne the conditions that must hold if a symmetric tariﬀ path is
to be a subgame-perfect one in our game. In every period, the continuation payoﬀ from
t h ep a t hm u s tb ea tl e a s ta sg r e a ta st h em a x i m a lp a y o ﬀ from deviation, given that a
punishment consistent with the WEC will ensue. From Lemma 1, the maximal relevant
payoﬀ from deviation at t is (1−δ)w(z(τt),τt)+δw(z(τt),(z(τt)). So, formally, we require:
(1−δ)(w(τt,τt)+δw(τt+1,τt+1)+... ) ≥ (1−δ)w(z(τt),τt)+δw(z(τt),(z(τt)),t=1 ,...
(3.5)
Of course, a whole set of paths will satisfy this sequence of inequalities: let this set of
equilibrium paths be denoted E. An eﬃcient tariﬀ reduction path in the set E is simply a
22More speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst order condition in the derivation of the deviation tariﬀ τ0 does not take
future retaliation into account because ˆ τ is a constant in the objective function.
13sequence {τt}∞
t=1 of tariﬀsi nE for which there is no other sequence {τ0
t}∞
t=1 also in E which
gives a higher payoﬀ to any country, as calculated by (2.1). Following the arguments of
Lockwood and Thomas (2002), it can be shown that if {τt}∞
t=1 is eﬃcient, (3.5) holds with
equality at every date i.e. :
(1−δ)(w(τt,τt)+δw(τt+1,τt+1)+... )=( 1−δ)w(z(τt),τt)+δw(z(τt),(z(τt)),t=1 ,...
(3.6)
The intuition is that if (3.5) held with strict inequality, it would be possible to reduce the
tariﬀ path by a small amount without violating (3.5).
Of the class of equilibrium paths E, it is obviously the eﬃcient path (shown to be
unique below) that is of most interest. It is generally accepted that the GATT provides a
mechanism through which countries are able to coordinate their selection of the eﬃcient
path (Bagwell and Staiger 1990). We now turn to characterizations of the eﬃcient equi-
librium path. Our ﬁrst main result, Proposition 3, establishes that free trade is in fact
impossible under WEC.
Proposition 3. (Failure to reach free trade.) Assume A1-A3. Let {τt}∞
t=1 be an
equilibrium path. Then τt > 0, for all δ < 1, all t.
The proof of this Proposition works by showing that if one country adopts free trade
at any point in time, then the other will have an incentive to deviate by levying a positive
tariﬀ. So such an agreement would not be self-enforcing. The result follows from Lemma
2, which shows that the best response to free trade is a positive tariﬀ.T h i si sc l e a r l yi n
contrast to the standard case with unlimited punishments. For in that case, countries can
credibly punish deviators by reverting to (for example) Nash tariﬀs ,a n dt h e ni ti sw e l l -
known that for some δ0 < 1, free trade can be attained in equilibrium for all δ > δ0. In the
present case, by contrast, the extent of the punishment is endogenously determined by
WEC to be exactly as severe as the initial deviation. So there always exists a worthwhile
deviation, decreasing with the discount rate, given that under WEC the punishment can
do no more than match the initial deviation in the subsequent periods.
We now turn to the more diﬃcult question of what form the eﬃcient path takes. Say
that an equilibrium tariﬀ reduction path is a stationary path if τt = τ, all t ≥ 1 (recall
τ0 =ˆ τ); that is, there is an immediate and permanent tariﬀ reduction. A stationary
14equilibrium path must satisfy:
α(τ) ≡ max
z≥τ
{(1 − δ)w(z,τ)+δw(z,z)} ≤ w(τ,τ) ≡ β(τ).
To characterize such paths, note ﬁrst the properties of α,β. First, β is decreasing in τ
by A2, and α is decreasing by A1, A2. Second, at the Nash equilibrium, as z =ˆ τ is a
best response to ˆ τ, α(ˆ τ)=β(ˆ τ) i.e. the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is a stationary
equilibrium path23.T h i r d ,
α(0) ≡ max
z≥0
{(1 − δ)w(z,0) + δw(z,z)} >w (0,0) ≡ β(0)
as a small increase in z from 0 strictly increases w(z,0) (from A1), while leaving w(z,z)
unchanged (as w(z,z) is maximized at zero, by A2).
So, the possibilities are shown in Figure 1. Next, as α,β are both downward-sloping,
they may have multiple crossing-points, as shown. Note that α(τ) and β(τ) coincide over




= w(τ,τ)=β(τ) for all τ ≥ τ
Finally, the smallest stationary equilibrium tariﬀ will be at the lowest crossing point
of α,β, namely τ∗. Moreover, using Lemma 2, it is possible to show that under some
additional assumptions, τ∗ = τ. Formally, we have:
Proposition 4. Assume A1-A3. Let τ0 =ˆ τ. There is a unique eﬃcient stationary path,
τt = τ∗,a l lt ≥ 1, where τ∗ > 0 is the smallest root of the equation α(τ)=β(τ). Moreover,
if A3 holds, and w11(τ,τ),w 22(τ,τ) ≤ 0 on [0,τ], then τ∗ = τ < ˆ τ.
Proposition 4 shows that under a withdrawal of equivalent concessions it is possible
for both countries to agree to reduce tariﬀs immediately to the level τ,h o l d i n gt h e m
there indeﬁnitely, and moreover, this is the best equilibrium stationary path. The result
is illustrated in Figure 2, which reﬁnes Figure 1.
23Note that it is not claimed that ˆ τ = ζ(ˆ τ). In fact, it is easily checked from the deﬁnition of (3.3) that
ζ(ˆ τ) < ˆ τ, so the constraint z ≥ ˆ τ in the deﬁnition of α binds, implying that z(ˆ τ)=ˆ τ, and consequently,
that α(ˆ τ)=( 1− δ)w(ˆ τ,ˆ τ)+δw(ˆ τ,ˆ τ)=w(ˆ τ,ˆ τ)=β(ˆ τ).
15The question then arises as to whether there is a non-stationary path in E which is
more eﬃcient than the stationary path τt = τ,t≥ 1. The following result answers this
negatively:
Proposition 5. Assume A1-A3. The stationary path, which has e τt = τ,a l lt ≥ 1, is
t h eu n i q u ee ﬃcient path in E.
The idea of the proof is the following. If there is a more eﬃcient equilibrium path,
then it must involve a tariﬀ τt < τ. But, the dynamics of (3.6), expressed as a diﬀerence
equation, tell us that once τt < τ, τt+1 < τt i.e. the path must be monotonically
decreasing. But this is impossible, as either it implies a stationary equilibrium path
below τ (impossible by deﬁnition), or a tariﬀ sequence diverging to minus inﬁnity (which
cannot be eﬃcient).
Our results can be illustrated with a quasi-linear example. Preferences can be as-
sumed to take the form of (A.14). This example is analyzed thoroughly in the appendix.
In the appendix we ﬁrst show that the Nash tariﬀ is ˆ τ =1 /(σ −1). It is then shown that
τ =
1 − δ
σ(1 + δ) − 1
. (3.7)
Note from (3.7) that in general, 0 < τ < ˆ τ.T h a t i s , τ → ˆ τ as δ → 0, and τ → 0 as
δ → 1. When agents place a high weight on future outcomes, tariﬀ rates close to zero can
be achieved under WEC. The elasticity of substitution between goods is also inversely
related to the level of τ. In the appendix we also verify that (A.14) satisﬁes assumptions
A1-A3.
I ft h eG A T Tp r o v i d e sam e a n sb yw h i c hc o u n t r i e ss e l e c tt h ee ﬃcient tariﬀ reduction
path, then Propositions 3, 4 and 5 provide a complete characterization of this path.
Accordingly, under WEC trade liberalization can be achieved, but free trade cannot be
reached. However, at present our model cannot “explain” the gradualism in tariﬀ-cutting
observed in the post war period.
164. Gradualism
In this section we analyze the eﬀect on equilibrium trade liberalization of imposing a
degree of tariﬀ irreversibility not just on the punisher but on the initial deviant as well.
Recall that in the previous section partial irreversibility was imposed only on the punisher;
the initial deviant was completely unrestricted in tariﬀ setting.
Our discussion draws on Chapter 6 of Bagwell and Staiger (2002) where enforce-
ment of international trade agreements under GATT is discussed.24 As explained above,
Bagwell and Staiger distinguish two types of initial deviation from an agreed tariﬀ level;
on-equilibrium-path deviations and oﬀ-equilibrium-path deviations. According to their
description an oﬀ-equilibrium-path deviation, familiar from the theory of repeated games,
is a reversion to the myopic best response tariﬀ level. An on-equilibrium-path deviation
is a smaller deviation required to keep the incentive compatibility constraint of the agree-
ment binding in response to an unexpected surge in import volumes. Retaliation to both
types of deviation is allowed for under the dispute settlement provisions of the GATT, in
particular Article XXIII.
In response to a relatively small on-equilibrium-path deviation, a ‘rebalancing of
concessions’ is allowed. This is where a trade partner simply withdraws concessions that
it made to the deviator that were not reciprocated. Such a WEC can take place either
under Article XIX if the measures can be agreed upon between parties themselves, or
under Article XXIII if a panel is required to provide independent arbitration to help
resolve a dispute in the interpretation of GATT rules.
However, under Article XXIII contracting parties may also authorize, in ‘appropri-
ately serious cases,’ a ‘suspension of GATT obligations.’ This, Bagwell and Staiger argue,
may be associated with a standard trigger-strategy punishment by reversion to myopic
best response tariﬀs. In their discussion, they suggest that a suspension of GATT oblig-
ations would occur only once a panel ruling had been violated, either by a deviator that
raised tariﬀs after a panel had ruled against them, or by a country that retaliated even
when the initial complaint was not upheld. However, in their formalization, a relatively
large (oﬀ-equilibrium-path) deviation is met by an immediate return to trigger strategies
24A more rigorous treatment of the model in Chapter 6 is presented in Bagwell and Staiger (1990).
17while a relatively small (on-equilibrium-path) deviation is met by immediate WEC.
Although we present an alternative formalization, our model shares the same feature
as Bagwell and Staiger’s (2002 Chapter 6) that a relatively large deviation is met by an
immediate return to trigger strategies while a relatively small deviation is met by imme-
diate WEC. The diﬀerence is that in our formalization a small deviation and retaliation
by WEC is an oﬀ-equilibrium-path deviation as well i.e. once a small deviation and WEC
takes place there is no return to the equilibrium path.
T h ef a c tt h a tW E Ci sa no ﬀ-equilibrium-path deviation in our framework represents
ad i ﬀerence in emphasis rather than a contradiction to Bagwell and Staiger’s approach.
Indeed, Bagwell and Staiger acknowledge that there is an oﬀ-equilibrium-path element to
such a deviation because the deviator stands in violation of the agreement if it does not
bring its policy back into conformity with GATT rules once the panel ruling is issued (see
Bagwell and Staiger 2002, footnote 5 on page 98). Bagwell and Staiger emphasize the
written form of the GATT, particularly of Article XIX, to argue that such deviations are
temporary and WEC ‘legalizes’ the deviation by establishing a rebalancing of concessions.
We, however, place emphasis on the observation by Dam (1970 page 100) that “most of the
tariﬀ increases made under Article XIX have in fact never been rescinded.” Dam then goes
on to point out that “an aﬀected trade partner could always demand that the concession
be reinstated and may invoke the dispute settlement procedures if no action is taken.”
The fact that in the majority of cases no such action was taken suggests that relatively
small deviations were simply matched with WEC, exactly as in our formalization.25
There is a second sense in which our formalization of a smaller deviation and re-
taliation by WEC diﬀers from Bagwell and Staiger’s. While Bagwell and Staiger back
such deviation by a stochastic shock, our modelling environment is stationary. Thus, our
deviation and subsequent WEC is admittedly more diﬃcult to justify. But again, Bagwell
and Staiger identify two components to such a deviation. While their formalization em-
phasizes the response to the stochastic shock, they also point out that an exception to an
agreement under Article XIX ‘raises the prospect that a government may be motivated
in part by a desire to shift the costs of its intervention onto its trading partner, thus
25Of course, according to the theory such oﬀ-equilibrium-path deviations should never have actually
been observed, but could be justiﬁed as ‘trembling’ or ‘learning’ about the way the GATT rules worked.
18upsetting ... the balance of concessions. In its original formulation, GATT’s Article XIX
addresses this possibility by allowing that the trading partner can then take a retaliatory
exception and withdraw its own substantially equivalent concession.’ (See Bagwell and
Staiger 2002 page 105.) Thus Bagwell and Staiger clearly suggest that while part of a
deviation is motivated directly by a shock, part is motivated by the desire to (opportunis-
tically) shift costs. But presumably, providing the violation is not too big, the exception
will be taken ‘in good faith’ and will simply be responded to by WEC. While Bagwell and
Staiger formalize the part of a deviation that is in direct response to a shock, we formalize
the part that is opportunistically motivated by a terms-of-trade gain.26
A natural question raised by Bagwell and Staiger’s (2002) discussion and our for-
malization is, in the absence of (full) veriﬁcation of a shock, how much a government can
deviate and still have its action taken ‘in good faith.’ There is no basis written into GATT
Articles on which to discriminate between a deviation that brings about a withdrawal of
equivalent concessions and one that provokes a suspension of GATT obligations. But for
the purposes of our analysis we need to formalize the distinction. To do this, say that
along the candidate equilibrium path, at period t−1, a given tariﬀ level τt−1 is achieved.
T h ea i mi st h e nt oa c h i e v es o m el o w e rt a r i ﬀ level e τt.A tp e r i o dt−1, the target tariﬀ level
e τt for period t is then said to be the binding for period t or scheduled binding (Article
II).27 By contrast, bindings already achieved for t−s, s ≥ 1 are said to be past bindings.
Country i breaks a scheduled binding by setting τt = τ0 such that τ0 > e τt;i np e r i o dt
i tf a i l st or e d u c ei t st a r i ﬀ to e τt. The punishment imposed on country i by country j then
depends on the extent to which the binding is broken. We distinguish two possibilities.
(i) In period t,c o u n t r yi breaks a binding but does not raise its tariﬀ above the level
set in t − 1; τt−1 ≥ τt = τ0 > e τt. It does not break a past binding. Then in period t +1
country j withdraws equivalent concessions.
26The ‘opportunistically motivated’ part does not arise in Bagwell and Staiger’s analysis because they
analyze a symmetric situation so the terms of trade eﬀects cancel; both countries deviate symmetrically
because they both face the same shock, which both can verify. We capture an asymmetric situation in
which only one country deviates, and its motives cannot be perfectly veriﬁed.
27In practice, a tariﬀ binding has come to be understood to represent one of three types of commitment:
(1) to lower a tariﬀ (duty) to a stated level; (2) not to raise a tariﬀ above its current level; (3) not to
raise a tariﬀ above a speciﬁed higher level (Dam 1970, page 31). In this present paper we focus on the
most popular usage of the term binding given by (1).
19(ii) In period t,c o u n t r yi breaks a past binding and does raise its tariﬀ above the
level set in t−1; τt > τt−1. Then in all future periods there is an indeﬁnite suspension of
GATT obligations; country j sets ˆ τ from t +1onwards.28
We say that when the actions of initial deviants are restricted in this way then we
have a tariﬀ game with bindings.
One aspect of this formalization may appear to go against the written procedure
for dispute settlement and needs clariﬁcation. As mentioned previously the procedures of
Article XXIII center on the notion of “nulliﬁcation and impairment” and do not require the
actual breach of a legal obligation (i.e. breaking a scheduled or past binding.) However,
as Dam (1970 page 360) points out, dispute settlement panels came to favor “an approach
that would make the legality of the trade measure under the substantive provisions of the
General Agreement the crucial factor in determinations of nulliﬁcation and impairment.”
According to this reading of events, through practice panels came to regard the breach
of a legal obligation to be the key condition for nulliﬁcation and impairment, as in our
formalization (Jackson 1989 backs this view; see page 95).
To summarize, our behavioral assumption essentially implies that, even if it is not
backed by a stochastic shock, an ‘opportunistically motivated’ deviation is taken in good
faith and is simply matched by a WEC as long as it does not break a past binding.
W en o ws h o wt h a ti fc o u n t r i e sa r es u ﬃciently patient then they will not break a past
binding under deviation in the knowledge that doing so will bring about a suspension of
GATT obligations.
28Thus we introduce a behavioral assumption about what aﬀected parties will tolerate and not an
assumption based on GATT rules. But given that such a distinction is called for by Bagwell and Staiger,
drawing the line at a past binding seems as reasonable as any. And it is entirely consistent with the
situation formalized by Bagwell and Staiger where a large but veriﬁable shock causes a past binding to
be broken but is nevertheless redressed by WEC.
It may nevertheless be argued that in practice parties have tolerated a breach of past bindings, and
responded by WEC. Our model could be extended to allow a past binding to be broken by a certain
margin λτt−1,w h e r eλ > 1, provided that λτt−1 << ˆ τ. However, the analysis on which this extension is
based is more complex, without changing the gradualism result qualitatively. Given, by Lemma 2, that
all z (τ) > τ for τ < τ, for the extension we would need an analogous ~ τ (say) for which z (~ τ)=λ~ τ.B y
construction it must be the case that ~ τ < τ.T h e nz (τ) >~ τ for τ <~ τ. Because deviation from ~ τ must
be more attractive than deviation from τ, there must be an upper bound on the value of λ and the range
of feasible δ < 1 must be reduced.
20Proposition 6. Assume A1-A3 and that governments play a tariﬀ game with bindings.
Then there is a 0 ≤ δ < 1 such that for all δ ∈ (δ,1) if a country deviates from a candidate
equilibrium path {e τt}∞
t=1 it does not break a past binding.
This result is based on Friedman’s (1971) “Nash-threats” folk theorem. A country
knows that if it deviates from a candidate equilibrium path in such a way that it breaks
a past binding, by setting τt = τ0 > τt−1, then this will provoke a suspension of GATT
obligations. As with the “Nash-threats” folk theorem, this triggers an indeﬁnite impo-
sition of myopic best responses ˆ τ. O nt h eo t h e rh a n di fac o u n t r yd e v i a t e si ns u c ha
way that it does not break a past binding, by setting τ0 ≤ τt−1, then under the punish-
ment phase tariﬀsa r eτ0. And by A2, symmetric tariﬀsa tτ0 yield a higher payoﬀ than
symmetric tariﬀsa tˆ τ.A t t h e l i m i t δ =1 ,c o u n t r i e sa r eh u r tm o r eb yt h el o w e rp a y o ﬀ
under suspension of GATT obligations ˆ τ. So there must exist a range δ ∈ (δ,1) for which
countries do not break past bindings under deviation.
How much does the bound on δ limit the applicability of this result and the others
that rely on it? It is generally recognized that as long as agents are able to adjust the
interval between periods, they can ensure that δ is in the required range for the result to
hold when it is in their interest. (See Scherer 1980 and Fudenberg and Tirole 1991 for
further discussion.) So a consistent explanation of the fact that past bindings were rarely
broken (until 1994) is that dispute resolution procedures operated suﬃciently quickly.
We can now reformulate the equilibrium conditions (3.5) under a tariﬀ game with
bindings. It is clear that in the event that a country deviates, the “optimal” deviation
given in (3.2) will be chosen, unless z (τt) > τt−1,i nw h i c hc a s eτt−1 will be chosen. So,
deﬁning χ(τt,τt−1)=m i n{z (τt),τt−1}, the equilibrium conditions become
(1 − δ)(w(τt,τt)+δw(τt+1,τt+1)+... ) ≥ (4.1)
(1 − δ)w(χ(τt,τt−1),τt)+δw(χ(τt,τt−1),χ(τt,τt−1)),t =1 ,...
As before, let the set of equilibrium tariﬀ paths be E, and deﬁne the eﬃcient tariﬀ paths
in E as those paths that maximize (2.1). Also as before, any eﬃc i e n tp a t hm u s ts a t i s f y
(4.1) with equality.
Proposition 6 says that there exists a range of δ for which a country’s deviation will
not exceed τt−1. It will be helpful in what follows to know the conditions under which
21the optimal deviation will be precisely equal to τt−1. We now establish in the next result
that for τt,τt−1 < τ, the optimal deviation is indeed equal to τt−1.
Lemma 3. Assume A1-A3, let δ ∈ (δ,1),a n dl e tτ be the (unique) value for which
z (τ)=ζ (τ)=τ given δ. If τt,τt−1 ≤ τ, then χ(τt,τt−1)=τt−1.
Recall that by Lemma 2, for all τ < τ,z (τ)=ζ (τ) ≥ τ > τ.I f τt,τt−1 ≤ τ then
it follows immediately that χ(τt,τt−1)=τt−1. Then for all t, τt−1 can be substituted for
χ(τt,τt−1) in the equilibrium condition (4.1), making characterization of an equilibrium
path possible.
We take two steps to prove that the eﬃcient tariﬀ reduction path is unique and
gradually decreasing under the tariﬀ game with bindings. We start by assuming, in
Lemma 4, that τt,τt−1 ≤ τ for all t ≥ 1 and show that the equilibrium tariﬀ sequence
must be strictly decreasing. Then in the ﬁnal result of the paper, Proposition 7, we
show that in the eﬃcient equilibrium tariﬀ s e q u e n c ei tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tτ1 < τ.
Gradual tariﬀ reductions then follow by Lemma 4. We ﬁrst present the results then give
the intuition.










,t > 1. (4.2)
Let {τt(τ0,τ1)}∞
t=2 be the sequence that solves (4.2) with initial conditions τ0,τ1. We
can now establish gradualism by showing that as long as there is a tariﬀ reduction in
the ﬁrst period then tariﬀs must strictly fall in all subsequent periods along any eﬃcient
equilibrium path.
Lemma 4. Assume A1 and δ ∈ (δ,1). Any sequence {τt(τ0,τ1)}∞
t=2 that satisﬁes (4.2),
with initial conditions τ0,τ1 that satisfy 0 < τ1 < τ0 and 0 < τ1 < τ, is strictly decreasing
i.e. 0 < τt+1(τ0,τ1) < τt(τ0,τ1) all t ≥ 2.
Now consider the construction of an eﬃcient path, given these results. First, τ0 is
given at ˆ τ. Second, from t =2onwards, i.e. conditional on τ0,τ1, the unique eﬃcient path
is simply {τt(τ0,τ1)}∞
t=2 as long as (i) τ1 < τ0 (required by Lemma 4), and (ii) τ1 ≤ τ
29See the proof of Lemma 4 for a full derivation of (4.2).
22(required by Lemma 3; otherwise, the eﬃcient path does not satisfy (4.2)). So, it remains
to choose τ1 ≤ τ < ˆ τ. I ft h ep a t hi st ob ee ﬃcient, the incentive constraint (4.1) must
hold with equality in period 1 i.e.
(1 − δ)(w(τ1,τ1)+δw(τ2(ˆ τ,τ1),τ2(ˆ τ,τ1)) + ...) (4.3)
=( 1 − δ)w(χ(τ1,ˆ τ),τ1)+δw(χ(τ1,ˆ τ),χ(τ1,ˆ τ))
We now have:
Proposition 7. Assume A1-A3, δ ∈ (δ,1), and that governments play a tariﬀ game
with bindings. There exists a smallest value of τ1, 0 < ˜ τ1 < τ, that satisﬁes (4.3).
Consequently, the path (˜ τ1,˜ τ2,˜ τ3,....) i st h eu n i q u ee ﬃcient path, with ˜ τt = τt(ˆ τ,˜ τ1),
t>1. This path exhibits a gradually decreasing tariﬀ i.e. ˜ τt+1 < ˜ τt,t≥ 1.
From Proposition 7 we learn that under a tariﬀ game with bindings it is possible
to achieve an equilibrium path for which ˜ τt < τ,a l lt ≥ 1. Consider some period s in
which tariﬀs have been reduced by a gradual process over periods t =1 ,...,s to some
tariﬀ level ˜ τs < τ. Now suppose that the agreement requires ˜ τs+1 < ˜ τs in period s+1.I f
the agreement proposes no further reductions in periods after that, then country j does
better by deviating whilst country i proceeds to set ˜ τs+1 < ˜ τs,e v e ni fc o u n t r yi imposes
the WEC penal code in all periods after that. But by Proposition 6, country j does not
break a past binding under deviation; its optimal deviation is to maintain ˜ τs in s +1 .30
And by Proposition 7, it is always possible for country i to promise additional reductions
in future periods that can more than compensate for the gains to deviation in period s+1.
This is gradualism in other words.
5. Conclusions
This paper helps to explain two stylized facts about trade liberalization, namely failure to
reach free trade and gradualism, by studying the interplay between countries’ unilateral
incentive to set tariﬀs and aspects of the institutional structure set up in the framework of
the GATT to achieve trade liberalization. In particular, aspects of the GATT’s Articles
30This is conditional upon δ ∈ (δ,1).
23are shown to impose partial irreversibility on countries’ ability to set tariﬀs. First, a with-
drawal of equivalent concessions limits the ability of contracting parties to raise tariﬀsi n
order to punish a country for deviating from an agreement under Article XVIII. Second,
while relatively small deviations may be punished by a withdrawal of equivalent conces-
sion, a larger deviation will provoke a suspension of GATT obligations. (As explained
above, this second feature is conditional upon an behavioral assumption about parties’
tolerance of deviations and how they are assumed to use available GATT rules as a result.)
Partial irreversibility imposed by a withdrawal of equivalent concessions is suﬃcient to
rule out free trade on the eﬃcient equilibrium path, but not to motivate gradualism. In
order for gradualism to arise on the eﬃcient equilibrium path, initial deviations must be
partially irreversible as well.
The starting point of our analysis is to take the GATT rules that we study as given
and assume that two countries have each already signed the GATT. We then play out
ad y n a m i ct a r i ﬀ reduction game and characterize the equilibrium path. Oﬀ-equilibrium-
path play is fully characterized by drawing on aspects of Articles XIX and XXIII. In so
doing we are able to show that (suﬃciently patient) countries can do no better than to
keep to a symmetrical gradual tariﬀ reduction path.
We show that once countries have signed up to the GATT, they can do no better
than to liberalize according the rules that it sets out. Yet it is clear that the GATT
would achieve greater eﬃciency if it sanctioned more severe punishments of deviators.
This raises an important question for future research, namely, what features are omitted
from the model in this present paper that might make WEC and the possibility to deviate
under Articles XIX and XXIII achieve eﬃciency? One direction in which to pursue an
answer would be to introduce stochastic productivity shocks to our model. Because it is
deterministic, our model rules out the possibility that Article XIX will actually be used,
as it was originally intended, to relax the participation constraint in a trade agreement
in the face of shocks that would otherwise precipitate the agreement’s break-up and a
return to greater protectionism. Whilst our analysis shows that WEC in conjunction with
Article XIX prevents eﬃciency from being achieved, in a stochastic world WEC might
be eﬃciency enhancing by enabling an agreement to survive. The eﬃciency enhancing
potential of Articles XIX and XXIII is discussed by Bagwell and Staiger (1990, and 2002
24Chapter 6). The interplay of these competing roles for deviation and retaliation presents
an interesting agenda for future research.
Inevitably, our theoretical framework simpliﬁes the situation in a number of other
key respects. Countries are assumed to be symmetrical, each country exports only a single
good, with both countries equally open at a given time. In practice countries export a
number of goods, with levels of openness varying across sectors. Variation in country
size and purchasing power across diﬀerent markets is likely to make the actual dynamics
of liberalization considerably more subtle and complex. Gradualism in a context where
there are asymmetries across countries has been studied by Bond and Park (2000), but
not within the context of the GATT penalty structure that we examine here.
A promising direction for future research would allow trade block formation to be
considered. The theory of repeated games has been used to study trade block formation,
where a preferential trade agreement is supported by the credible threat of punishment.
In a recent paper using a repeated game framework Bond, Syropoulos and Winters (2001)
point out that trade liberalization within the European Union has been very slow.31 It may
be that our framework could be adapted to provide a way of understanding gradualism
between members.
There may be many other competing pressures other than the standard terms-of-
trade motive working against further liberalization, and these are also suppressed in our
m o d e l . O n ea r e at h a th a sa t t r a c t e ds i g n i ﬁcant attention recently is the incentive for
politicians to give in to protectionist inducements from interest groups (Grossman and
Helpman 1995). These protectionist forces may have been outweighed at an early stage
in the post-war trade liberalization process when liberalization gains were large relative
to the rents from protectionism, but not later once the potential trade gains began to
be exhausted. Future research could usefully study the interaction of these counteracting
forces.
The main point of the present paper is that under GATT rules trade liberalization
must be gradual. A natural question follows as to ‘how gradual’ trade liberalization
becomes as a result. Given the competing explanations for gradualism, it would be diﬃcult
31Bond, Riezman and Syropoulos (2003) also draw attention to the gradual nature of liberalization
within FTAs.
25to disentangle which is attributable to the forces for gradualism that we describe here. One
possibility is to use simulations. In an earlier version of this present paper, Lockwood and
Zissimos (2002), we made some progress in this direction by undertaking simulations based
on the quasi-linear preferences presented in the appendix. Yet these were unsatisfactory
in that they appeared to show ‘too much liberalization too soon’ given what we have
actually observed. Further work is needed to establish how the forces for gradualism vary
with diﬀerent functional forms and whether they tend to exacerbate other factors that
slow down the liberalization process.
A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Propositions
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .(a) First, suppose that a country deviates to zt < e τt. Then, from
(3.1), as there is no retaliation, future payoﬀsa r eu n a ﬀected by the choice of deviation.
Moreover, as w(zt,˜ τt) is increasing in zt by A1, the payoﬀ to deviation of the form zt < e τt
is increasing in zt. Therefore, the supremum of the payoﬀ to this kind of deviation is
lim
zt→e τt









(b) If a country deviates to zt > e τt, it receives
g(zt,˜ τt)=( 1− δ)w(zt,˜ τt)+δw(zt,z t) (A.1)
So, it suﬃces to show that (A.1) has a global maximum z∗
t on (τt,∞). If this is not the case,
then there exists an increasing sequence {zn} with limn→∞ zn →∞ , for which g(zn,τt)
is monotonically increasing. But, for zn high enough, the resulting consumption bundle,
call it x(zn,τt), must be close to the autarchy allocation, and by the Inada conditions
on utility, this will yield the consumer in the deviating country a lower utility than (for
example) the bundle x(τt,τt) generated by not deviating. Contradiction. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) By deﬁnition, z(τ)=m a x {ζ(τ),τ}. Moreover, as ζ(.) is
decreasing in τ, it must be the case that there exists a τ for which ζ(τ) > τ, τ < τ,
ζ(τ) < τ, τ > τ.
26(ii) We now prove that τ < ˆ τ. Suppose not; consider τ =ˆ τ ﬁrst. By the deﬁnition





(w1(ˆ τ,ˆ τ)+w2(ˆ τ,ˆ τ)) = 0
But by a standard argument, the myopic best response tariﬀ ˆ τ solves w1(ˆ τ,ˆ τ)=0 .B y
A 2 ,w eh a v et h a tw1(ˆ τ,ˆ τ)+w2(ˆ τ,ˆ τ) < 0. Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition cannot be
satisﬁed at τ =ˆ τ; a contradiction. Then τ > ˆ τ can also be ruled out because w1(τ,τ) < 0
for τ > ˆ τ.
Combining the fact that z(τ)=m a x{ζ(τ),τ} and the fact that there exists a unique
τ for which τ = ζ(τ) with ζ(τ) declining in τ,w es e et h a tz(τ)=ζ(τ) for τ < τ and
z(τ)=τ for τ ≥ τ.
(iii) To see that z (0) > 0, suppose to the contrary that z (0) = 0. Note that by the
optimality of free trade, w(0,0) >w (τ,τ), τ 6=0 , which of course implies that
w1(0,0) + w2(0,0) = 0
Now, consider a small increase in zt from 0, say ∆. Then, the eﬀect of this change in zt
on the deviation payoﬀ is
∆[(1 − δ)w1(0,0) + δ(w1(0,0) + w2(0,0))] = (1 − δ)∆w1(0,0) > 0
where the last inequality follows from A1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose not. Suppose instead that after country i initially
deviates in period t to z (τt) and country j matches the deviation in t+1by also setting
z (τt), there is an incentive for some country to deviate from z (τt) in some period s>
t +1 . By Lemma 2, the initial deviation has two characterizations: (i) if τt < τ then
z(τt)=ζ (τ) ≥ τ > τ;( i i )i fτt ≥ τ then z(τt)=τt. Each will be taken in turn.
(i) If τt < τ and so z(τt)=ζ (τt) ≥ τ > τt then, by Lemma 2 (ii), the best response
to z(τt) must also be z(τt). To see why, observe that for z(τt) > τ the unconstrained best
response given by (3.3) is ζ (τt) < τ but that the constraint zt ≥ τt in (3.2) is binding.
Therefore, z(τt) is a best response to itself; contradiction. Of course, τ is self enforcing,
so the contradiction is immediate.
27(ii) If τt ≥ τ then z(τt)=τt ≥ τ and so, again by Lemma 2 (ii), the best response
to z(τt) must also be z(τt); contradiction. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Suppose to the contrary that WEC is not a subgame per-
fect punishment strategy; z(τt) is not a best response given the initial deviation z(τt).
Henceforth we write z(τt) as z.L e tτ0 be a best response to z given suspension of GATT
obligations next period, triggering ˆ τ by both countries. Then choosing τ0 in some period
after initial deviation must bring about a higher payoﬀ than adherence to WEC; that is,
(1 − δ)w(τ
0,z)+δw(ˆ τ,ˆ τ) > (1 − δ)w(z,z)+δw(z,z).
Note that, by Lemma 2(iii), z>0 (requiring A1). Also note that the left and right
hand sides of the inequality are consistent with one another because the initial deviation
z is the same whether there is adherence to WEC or a suspension of GATT obligations.
Given that tariﬀs under suspension of GATT obligations are ﬁxed at ˆ τ,w eh a v et h a t
τ0 is chosen to solve w1 (τ0,z)=0 . Using values under a suspension of GATT obligations





(w1 (ˆ τ,ˆ τ)+w2 (ˆ τ,ˆ τ)) < 0,




(w1 (z,z)+w2 (z,z)) = 0,
i ei tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tw1 (z,z) > 0 because (w1 (z,z)+w2 (z,z)) < 0 by A2 and
z>0. Indeed, given initial deviation at z, by construction payoﬀsa r eo p t i m i z e db y
choosing z in response. So (1 − δ)w(τ0,z)+δw(ˆ τ,ˆ τ) < (1 − δ)w(z,z)+δw(z,z);a
contradiction. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Suppose to the contrary that τt =0for some t. Then, at t,
the incentive constraint is
(1 − δ)w(0,0) + δw(0,0) ≥ (1 − δ)w(z(0),0) + δw(z(0),z(0)) (A.2)
But recall that, by Lemma 2(iii) at the solution to (3.2) z (0) > 0. This implies
(1 − δ)w(z (0),0) + δw(z (0),z(0)) > (1 − δ)w(0,0) + δw(0,0),
28contradicting (3.5). ¤
Proof of Proposition 4. The only part that does not follow directly from Figure 1 is
that τ∗ = τ. To prove this, it is suﬃcient to show that on the interval [0,τ], the slope of
α is greater than the slope of β in absolute value. This slope condition clearly rules out
t h ec a s ei nF i g u r e1 ,w h e r eτ∗ < τ.32 Now, the slope of β is
β
0(τ)=w1(τ,τ)+w2(τ,τ) (A.3)
Moreover, from Lemma 2, the constraint z ≥ τ is not binding on [0,τ], so diﬀerentiating
α and applying the envelope theorem gives:
α
0(τ)=( 1− δ)w2(z,τ) (A.4)





and from A3 we have w2(z,τ) − w2(τ,τ) < 0,s o
α
0(τ) ≤ (1 − δ)w2(τ,τ). (A.5)
S o ,f r o m( A . 3 ) ,( A . 5 ) ,t h er e q u i r e dc o n d i t i o ni st h a t
(1 − δ)w2(τ,τ) <w 1(τ,τ)+w2(τ,τ)
Rearranging, this is
0 <w 1(τ,τ)+δw2(τ,τ) (A.6)
But, the FOC deﬁning τ is:
w1(τ,τ)+δw2(τ,τ)=0 (A.7)




[w11 +( 1+δ)w12 + δw22]dx (A.8)
where the derivatives on the RHS of (A.8) are evaluated at (x,x). By A3, w12 < 0. By
assumption, w11,w 22 ≤ 0. So, (A.8 ) implies (A.6), as required.
32The case shown in Figure 2, where τ∗ < τ, requires that the slope of α must be less than that of β
in absolute value somewhere in the interval [τ∗,τ].
29The fact that τ∗ = τ < ˆ τ follows from Lemma 2. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. (a) Following the proof of Lockwood and Thomas (2002),
Lemma 2.2, which uses assumptions analogous to A1-A3, the equilibrium conditions (3.6)




[α(τt) − (1 − δ)β(τt)],t=1 ,.. (A.9)
with initial condition τ0 =ˆ τ, plus the condition that the solution to (A.9) is bounded.
To see this, note ﬁrst that advancing the equality in (A.9) by one period (i.e. from t to
t +1 ) , multiplying the t +1 −condition by δ and subtracting from the t−condition, we
get:
(1 − δ)w(τt,τt)=( 1− δ)w(z(τt),τt)+δw(z(τt),(z(τt)) (A.10)
−δ[(1 − δ)w(z(τt+1),τt+1)+δw(z(τt+1),(z(τt+1))],t=1 ,..
Using the deﬁnitions of α,β in (A.10) and rearranging, we get33 (A.9).
(b) Now suppose that the path {τt} is in E and more eﬃcient than the stationary
path τ. Then, for some t, τt < τ (otherwise, τt ≥ τ, all t, s oi tc a n n o tb em o r ee ﬃcient).
We now show that if τt < τ, then τt+1 < τt. For suppose not. Then, as α is decreasing in
τt, we would have
α(τt+1) ≤ α(τt) (A.11)
Combining (A.9) and (A.11), we have
1
δ
[α(τt) − (1 − δ)β(τt)] ≤ β(τt)= ⇒ α(τt) ≤ β(τt)
But as τt < τ, α(τt) > β(τt), a contradiction. So, any solution of (A.9) is clearly a strictly
decreasing sequence. There are then two possibilities. First, limt→∞ τt = τ∞ > ∞. But
then α(τ∞)=β(τ∞), contradicting the deﬁnition of τ > τ∞ a st h es m a l l e s tr o o to f
α(τ)=β(τ). The other is limt→∞ τt = −∞. B u tt h i sp a t hc a n n o tb em o r ee ﬃcient than
the stationary path, a contradiction. ¤




So, as long as limt→∞ α(τt)=0 , (A.9) implies (3.6).
30P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .Note that a tariﬀ proﬁle in which ˆ τ is set in every period is an
equilibrium path because the subgame in each period is a Nash equilibrium. But there is
no incentive for either country to break a past binding by deviating upwards from such a
path. So we restrict attention to a candidate equilibrium path for which e τt < ˆ τ at some t.
A l s o ,i tm a yb et h ec a s et h a tt h eo p t i m a ld e v i a t i o nf r o me τt entails z (τt) ≤ τt−1,i nw h i c h
a deviant has no incentive to break a past binding. Therefore, we only need to consider
situations where z (τt) > τt−1.
Normalize so that t =1is the ﬁr s tp e r i o di nw h i c he τt < ˆ τ;l e tτ0 =ˆ τ and e τ1 =
e τ < ˆ τ. We are interested in situations where a country has an incentive to break a past
binding, that is, to set τt = τ0 > τt−1. Suppose to the contrary that no δ < 1 can be
found for which a deviant fails to break a past binding. Then in some period t ≥ 2 the
deviant, country i,m u s tﬁnd it optimal to set a tariﬀ τt = τ0 > τt−1 given that country j
sets τt = e τt. (Note that we use t ≥ 2 h e r ea st h e r eh a v eb e e nn opast bindings at period
t =1 .) If the deviant sets τ0 > τt−1 then this triggers ˆ τ in all future periods, and this
must yield a higher payoﬀ than setting τt−1 and facing WEC in all future periods:
(1 − δ)w(τ
0,e τt)+δw(ˆ τ,ˆ τ) > (1 − δ)w(τt−1,e τt)+δw(τt−1,τt−1).
By A1, A3, the largest possible gains from breaking a past binding occur for e τt =0 .N o w
τt−1 ≤ e τ. So if we can show that there exists a δ < 1 for which
(1 − δ)w(τ
0,0) + δw(ˆ τ,ˆ τ) < (1 − δ)w(τt−1,e τt)+δw(e τ,e τ)
then we have established a contradiction. First note that, by A2, w(e τ,e τ) ≤ w(τt−1,τt−1).
But e τ < ˆ τ and so, again by A2, w(ˆ τ,ˆ τ) <w(e τ,e τ). Therefore, as the inequality holds
strictly at the δ =1limit, it must hold for a range of δ less than 1. Also, as it holds for
w(τ0,0),i tm u s th o l df o ra l le τt > 0 under which the gains to breaking past bindings are
smaller. This establishes a contradiction. ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .By Lemma 2 there exists a unique solution τ for any δ ∈ (0,1).B y
Lemma 2(ii), z (τt) ≥ τ for any τt ≤ τ and by assumption τ ≥ τt−1.T h e nb yd e ﬁnition,
χ(τt,τt−1)=τt−1. ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 .The proof is by induction. By assumption τt < τt−1 < τ.
31From (4.1) and Lemma 3, an eﬃcient path with τt ≤ τ,t≥ 1 must satisfy
(1 − δ)(w(τt,τt)+δw(τt+1,τt+1)+... )= (A.12)
(1 − δ)w(τt−1,τt)+δw(τt−1,τt−1),t =1 ,...
Advancing (A.12) one period, multiplying both sides by δ, subtracting from (A.12), and












which is a second-order diﬀerence equation34 in τt. This can be seen more clearly by











Rewriting (4.2), we get:









By Proposition 6 and Lemma 3 we know that for δ ∈ (δ,1) and for τt < τt−1 < τ the
































Therefore w(τt,τt+1) >w (τt,τt).B u tt h e n ,b yA 1 ,τt+1 < τt as required. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 .In order for χ(τt,τt−1)=τt−1 to be the optimal deviation, by
Proposition 6, we require that δ ∈ (δ,1). Now, rewrite (4.3) as a function of τ1 :
f(τ1)=( 1 − δ)w(χ(τ1,ˆ τ),τ1)+δw(χ(τ1,ˆ τ),χ(τ1,ˆ τ))
−(1 − δ)(w(τ1,τ1)+δw(τ2(ˆ τ,τ1),τ2(ˆ τ,τ1)) + ...)
34This is an unusual diﬀerence equation in that it has a continuum of stationary solutions i.e. setting
τt−1 = τt = τt+1 always solves (2.1 ).
32Note that by the deﬁnition of τ (see Lemma 2)
(1 − δ)w(χ(τ,ˆ τ),τ)+δw(χ(τ,ˆ τ),χ(τ,ˆ τ)) = w(τ,τ)
Moreover, τt(ˆ τ,τ) < τ, all t by Lemma 4. So, if τ1 = τ then (4.1) is slack i.e.
(1 − δ)(w(τ,τ)+δw(τ2(ˆ τ,τ),τ2(ˆ τ,τ)) + ...)
>w (τ,τ)=( 1− δ)w(χ(τ,ˆ τ),τ)+δw(χ(τ,ˆ τ),χ(τ,ˆ τ))
where the inequality follows by A2. So, we have shown that f(τ) < 0.
Next, if τ1 = ε, we have
(1 − δ)w(χ(ε,ˆ τ),ε)+δw(χ(ε,ˆ τ),χ(ε,ˆ τ)) = max
ε≤z≤ˆ τ
(1 − δ)w(z,ε)+δw(z,z) >w (ε,ε)
for ε small enough: the inequality is strict by Lemma 2 above, as for ε small enough,
z(ε) > ε. Moreover, from Lemma 4, for ε small enough,
(1 − δ)(w(ε,ε)+δw(τ2(ˆ τ,ε),τ2(ˆ τ,ε)) + ...) ' w(ε,ε)
So, it is possible to choose ε small enough so that
(1 − δ)(w(ε,ε)+δw(τ2(ˆ τ,ε),τ2(ˆ τ,ε)) + ...) < (1 − δ)w(χ(ε,ˆ τ),ε)+δw(χ(ε,ˆ τ),χ(ε,ˆ τ))
i.e. f(ε) > 0. Now, by inspection, f(.) is continuous in τ1 as χ and τt are continuous
in τ1. So, there exists at least one value of τ1 for which f(τ1)=0 , and so there exists a
smallest such value. ¤
A.2. An Example: Quasi-linear Preferences
We work through the analysis of the paper for a simple endowments model where agents
have quasi-linear preferences. Each country i ∈ {1,2} has an endowment (normalized to
unity) of good i (or is endowed with a factor of production that can produce 1 unit of
good i). We denote by xi
j the consumption of good j in country i. The preferences of the











σ ,i=1 ,2 (A.14)
33with σ > 1,a n dw h e r exi
j is consumption of good j. σ measures the elasticity if substitution




i + pj(1 + τ
i)x
i
j = pi + Ri (A.15)
where pj,a n dRi are respectively: the world price of good j and tariﬀ revenue in country
i which, as is usually assumed, is returned to the consumer in a lump-sum. Note that
whilst in the text above we referred to country i’s tariﬀ in period t as τi
t here time



























where the demand for good i, xi
i is determined residually via the budget constraint.
Indirect utility for the representative household in i is therefore derived by substitut-















































1−σ + pτ [p(1 + τ)]
−σ (A.21)
Finally, we need to calculate how the (reciprocal of) terms of trade for country i, p,
changes with τ0,τ. Evaluating (A.16) ,(A.17) at τj = τ0 τi = τ, pj = p, pi =1 ,w eg e t ;
x
i
i =1 + pτ [p(1 + τ)]










34So, substituting (A.22),(A.23) into the market-clearing condition for good i, namely that




i),w eh a v e
pτ [p(1 + τ)]














Note that as σ > 0.5 by assumption, pτ < 0 i.e. an increase in i0s tariﬀ always improves







1−σ + pτ [p(1 + τ)]
−σ
So, a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium in tariﬀsi saˆ τ such that v(ˆ τ,p(ˆ τ,ˆ τ)) ≥ v(τ,p(τ,ˆ τ)), all
τ 6=ˆ τ.
As v is continuously diﬀerentiable, we can characterize ˆ τ as the solution to
vτ(ˆ τ,p(ˆ τ,ˆ τ)) + vp(ˆ τ,p(ˆ τ,ˆ τ))pτ(ˆ τ,ˆ τ)=0 (A.25)

















So, using (A.26) and the fact that p(ˆ τ,ˆ τ)=1 , we have from (A.25) that
−σˆ τ(1 + ˆ τ)
−σ−1 +[ −(1 + ˆ τ)







Eliminating common terms, we get








35for the optimal tariﬀ.R e c a l lt h a tσ > 1,s oˆ τ is deﬁned and positive.
Now we have ˆ τ, we can check that A1, A2 and A3 hold for tariﬀs set on the interval
[0,ˆ τ]
























The sign of this expression depends on the term in brackets (1 − (σ − 1)τ).I fτ =ˆ τ =
1/(σ − 1) and (1 − (σ − 1)τ)=0so w1(τ,τ0)=0 .I fτ < ˆ τ then (1 − (σ − 1)τ) > 0 and
























Now the sign of this expression depends on the termin brackets (στ (2 + τ + τ0) − (1 + τ)τ0).
It is easy to see that when τ = τ0 =0we have (στ (2 + τ + τ0) − (1 + τ)τ0)=0and
therefore w1(τ,τ0)+w2(τ,τ0)=0 . This is necessary for free trade to maximize eﬃciency.
Moreover, by inspection (στ (2 + τ + τ0) − (1 + τ)τ0) > 0 for all τ,τ0 ∈ (0,ˆ τ), σ > 1,s o
w1(τ,τ0)+w2(τ,τ0) < 0 as required. Finally, regarding A3:
w12 (τ,τ
0)=−
(σ − 1)σ2 (1 + τ)








So w12 (τ,τ0) < 0 because (1 − (σ − 1)τ) > 0 for τ,τ0 ∈ (0,ˆ τ) as required.
Now we want to characterize the constrained deviation, using it to derive τ. Setting




(w1(z (τ),z(τ)) + w2(z (τ),z(τ))) = 0.







where γ (z (τ)) =
(1+z(τ))1−σ



















It is then straightforward to see that the ﬁrst order condition can be rewritten (1 − δ)w1(z (τ),τ)+







Substituting for γ (τ) and γ0 (τ) and simplifying, the equation becomes
σ (1 + τ)
−1−σ (1 − δ +( 1− σ (1 + δ))τ)
2σ − 1
=0
Solving, the only admissible root35 is
τ =
1 − δ
σ(1 + δ) − 1
.
35The root τ = −1 also solves this expression.
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